Is China supplying Pakistan with a dual-use chemical agent to be used by Pakistan authorities for law and order in Balochistan? Confiscation of a controlled chemical by Indian customs in Tamil Nadu’s Kattupalli port on May 8 this year has raised concerns. The China-Pakistan nexus on surreptitious transport of sensitive material is now venturing into uncharted territory as well.
Shanghai To Karachi
The chemical in question, known as ‘ortho-chloro benzylidene malononitrile (CS), was shipped by a Chinese firm, Chengdu Shichen Trading Co. Ltd, to Rohail Enterprises, a Rawalpindi-based company. The consignment was loaded onto a carrier vessel ‘Hyundai Shanghai’ (sailing under the Cyprus flag) on April 18 at Shanghai Port.
According to sources, the vessel reached Kattupalli Port around 11 pm on May 8 on its voyage to Karachi. An intelligence tip-off had alerted the customs authorities, who got the consignment offloaded. Investigations revealed that in addition to being on a controlled list under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the use and transport of the CS chemical is also governed by the Wassenaar Arrangement and is placed in India’s dual-use items list SCOMET.
Incapacitating Chemical Agent
Given the usage of the CS chemical as an incapacitating agent, it is possible that Pakistani law enforcement agencies could use it against rebel groups. Besides raising human rights concerns, the seizure also indicates potential complicity of China in trying to protect its own interests in Balochistan. Those are increasingly coming under strain with frequent attacks on Chinese assets and personnel.
China Helping Itself
China, as is well-known, has invested heavily in various projects under the ambit of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor or CPEC in Balochistan. However, these projects have remained a non-starter due to opposition by Baloch sub-nationalist groups. Covert supply of controlled substances by China to Pakistan suggests that Beijing is doing this deliberately to protect its own interests in Pakistan.
European and American regulators and intelligence agencies have kept a close watch on unchecked trading of dual-use technologies by China and Pakistan. But some European capitals are now asking if these efforts are enough.
Germany Wary
In June 2023, an annual report released by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution for the German state of Baden-Württemberg highlighted: “Iran, Pakistan, North Korea and Syria are still pursuing such efforts. They aim to complete existing arsenals, perfect the range, deployability and effectiveness of their weapons and develop new weapons systems. They are trying to obtain the necessary products and relevant know-how, inter alia, through illegal procurement efforts in Germany.”
‘Bypass Countries’
An analysis of this report suggests ‘bypass countries’ like Turkey and China could help Pakistan and North Korea that are in the business of illegal and unrestricted proliferation to route their proliferation weapons and help the business to grow.
In addition, Ilya Kahn, a citizen of the United States, Israel and Russia, and resident of Brooklyn, New York, and Los Angeles, California, who was arrested by US authorities on January 17 this year for his alleged involvement in a years-long scheme to secure and unlawfully export sensitive technology from the United States for the benefit of a Russian business, used a network of businesses in China and other countries to illegally transfer hundreds of thousands of semiconductors to sanctioned business with ties to Russian military.
Chinese Firms Sanctioned
In April 2024, The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) sanctioned three Chinese companies. These were Tianjin Creative Source International Trade Co Ltd, Granpect Company Limited, and Xi’an Longde Technology Development Company. It was for supplying key components to Pakistan’s ballistic missile programme.
China Acting As Hub
In May 2024, the Directorate of State Security and Intelligence (DSN) of Austria released ‘Constitutional ProtectionReport-2023’. It reviewed the global security situation in 2023 and its implications on Austria’s national security. The report emphasised the role of China, which occupies a special position globally when it comes to proliferation. It mentioned that China acted as a global buyer for sanctioned states in the European market and also in Austria.
It said that Pakistan has traditionally maintained good relations with China. Besides, its procurement processes for dual-use goods from Europe often involve fake companies and dealer networks in the Arabian Peninsula. It mentioned that Pakistani proliferation attempts rose in 2023 through civilian intermediaries in China which are not sanctioned. These intermediaries are usually no longer subject to de facto control by Austrian exporters. This is how China becomes a global hub for sanctioned goods, an assessment by intelligence agencies has concluded.
